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on the textual unweaving tactics of supplementarity, exemplarity, and 
parergonality, with a view to critically assessing institutional (UNESCO’s) and 
ordinary tourists’ claims to authenticity as regards artifacts and sites of ‘cultural 
heritage’. Through the ‘destru[k]tion’ of claims to ‘originality’ and ‘myths of 
origin’, that function as preservatives for canning such artifacts and sites, the 
cultural arche-writing that forces signifiers to piously bow before a limited 
string of ‘transcendental signifieds’ is brought to full view. The stench of the 
aeons is thus forced to evaporate through a post-transcendentalist opening 
towards originary myths’ original doubles.  
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1  Introduction 
The cultural and natural heritage is among the priceless and irreplaceable assets, not only 
of each nation, but of humanity as a whole. The loss, through deterioration or 
disappearance, of any of these most prized assets constitutes an impoverishment of the 
heritage of all the peoples of the world. Parts of that heritage, because of their exceptional 
qualities, can be considered to be of “Outstanding Universal Value” and as such worthy of 
special protection against the dangers which increasingly threaten them. (UNESCO World 
Heritage Center 2012: 2) 
While working within the operational definition of cultural heritage that 
lurks behind and beneath the stipulations contained in the above paragraph 
from UNESCO’s World Heritage Center’s operational guidelines (and more 
explicitly laid out in Articles 1 and 2 of the World Heritage Convention 
[henceforth denoted as ‘Convention’]), we notice, first and foremost, that 
cultural heritage is almost equivalent to the survival of the notion of humanity 
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(if not of humanity from a sheer materiality point of view). Then, this heritage is 
priceless, and, hence, does not abide by any exchange system. The cultural sites 
and artifacts to be preserved are cited in UNESCO’s constantly updated World 
Heritage List. Although this heritage is priceless, it still constitutes a form of 
‘asset’ of ‘outstanding universal value’. Thus, we are concerned with assets that 
do have value (and, subsequently, do abide by a certain exchange system), yet 
whose value is incalculable and, by implication, priceless. Evidently, we are 
concerned with a limit conception of value or with the value of all values, where 
value, at this juncture, concerns both economic and cultural capital. Economic 
capital concerns the financial value of cultural heritage which is in excess of 
calculability, whence stems the priceless nature of cultural heritage. Cultural 
capital concerns the universally binding axiological framework that is 
represented in this cultural heritage, whose gravitas is so weighty, as to 
endanger the sustenance of the notion of humanity should this heritage perish. 
The coupling of these two forms of capital does manifest an exchange system, 
quite remarkably an impossible one, viz., that an infinite supply of economic 
capital always already falls short of the value surplus that is inherent in cultural 
heritage. In other words, cultural heritage is always already in excess of any 
potential amount of money that might be offered for its purchase, by dint of the 
fact that this heritage only exists because it cannot be dislocated from a locus of 
excess where it is by definition situated in a configuration of economic/cultural 
forms of capital. A potential agreement on a determinate sum for its purchase 
would entail its devaluation and, at the same time, dislocation. Not only is 
cultural heritage priceless, but also immovable. It can only be preserved.  
“Outstanding Universal Value means cultural and/or natural significance 
which is so exceptional as to transcend national boundaries and to be of 
common importance for present and future generations of all humanity” (par.49 
of the Convention). Four out of the ten criteria that must be met (at least one) in 
order for a cultural site/artifact to be considered as having outstanding 
universal value, as per par.77 of the Convention, stipulate some sort of 
exemplarity (“be outstanding examples…”). Furthermore, “to be deemed of 
Outstanding Universal Value, a property must also meet the conditions of 
integrity and/or authenticity” (par.78 of the Convention). Authenticity concerns 
the originality of the characteristics of the cultural heritage site/artifact and its 
meaning. Integrity concerns the wholeness and intactness of the cultural 
heritage and its attributes. In sum, the inclusion of a cultural site/artifact in the 
World Heritage List presupposes the incidence of global cultural significance of 
the concerned sites/artifacts, coupled with their exemplarity, originality and 
integrity.  
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Now, by resuming the introductory analysis of the exchange system 
wherein cultural heritage is by definition embedded, and in the light of the 
subsequent caveats about key terms, we may discern that the cultural capital 
that is engraved in the world heritage list must resonate with globally appealing 
meaning. Thus, the cultural economy that is circumscribed by the Convention 
essentially boils down to exchanges of meaning. Therefore, we may validly 
claim that the cultural sites/artifacts that are included in the World Heritage List 
constitute cultural signs, whose meaning consists of relationships between 
signifiers (or the signs’ formal properties) and signifieds (or the signs’ 
conceptual aspects), based on the traditional Saussurean semiological model. 
The significance of these signs as correlations between signifiers and signifieds 
emerges at the level of the signs’ exchange for globally appealing values or a 
global axiological nexus that makes up, in a nutshell, humanity’s ‘ego ideal’. In 
other words, we are primarily concerned with a semiotic economy that 
comprises signs and axiological elements as its essential components.  
The deconstructive reading of the Convention’s definitional cornerstones 
and the accompanying World Heritage List that is offered in this article, aims at 
yielding a sketch map of this semiotic economy and the form of cultural capital 
that is definitive of humanity’s cultural heritage, as enshrined in UNESCO’s 
Convention. In greater detail, I draw on relevant textual unweaving tactics from 
Derrida’s deconstruction(ist) toolbox, such as supplementarity, exemplarity, 
parergonality, with view to contextualizing the correspondingly interlocking 
terms of the Convention, as above laid out. Then, I consider how 
meaning/significance is produced for the featured sites/artifacts and what this 
meaning amounts to. Finally, I dwell on how the cultural meaning of the 
World’s Heritage List is reproduced in situated meaning-making instances, as 
derived from secondary data about tourists’ motivations for visiting cultural 
heritage sites, that is visitors whose primary relationship with cultural 
destinations neither lies within a scientific purview nor is funded by an 
organization for research purposes. 
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2  The authentic supplementarity of cultural 
heritage 
2.1  Deconstruction as toolbox of reading tactics 
As explicitly stated by Derrida, deconstruction “inaugurates the destruction, not 
the demolition, but the de-sedimentation, the de-construction, of all the 
significations that have their source in that of the logos. Particularly the 
signification of truth” (Derrida 1997: 11). A deconstructive reading is primarily 
concerned with laying bare fundamental presuppositions that permeate a 
textual corpus. Derrida’s adamant preoccupation with the pervasive 
metaphysical binarisms that underpin classical philosophical texts of the 
Western tradition, and with the demonstration of their originary character, has 
been abundantly reflected in non-philosophical fields that have been borrowing 
deconstructive concepts/rhetorical stratagems (as reading tactics), such as 
‘metaphysics of presence’ and the repeatedly misused ‘différance’. In the 
context of cultural analysis, deconstruction(ist) discourse’s active engagement 
with key semiotic concepts renders it particularly apt for critically addressing 
the invisible relationships between different levels of cultural meta-narratives 
(such as the above-quoted one by UNESCO) and experiences, such as those 
involved while visiting tourist destinations. Additionally, deconstructionist 
concepts and tactics are particularly useful for re-contextualizing consumption 
drivers behind manifest responses in cognitivist research. Thus, the intuitive 
employment of terms, such as ‘motivation’ or ‘authenticity’, that are 
customarily employed in this type of research, may be interpretively expanded 
towards more phenomenologically inclined territories, of which deconstruction 
partakes (in a wider sense; see Lawlor 2002 and Watkin 2009 for approaches to 
the relationship between deconstruction and phenomenology). This re-
contextualization is effected by tracing the use of fundamental concepts 
throughout the history of philosophical texts, including the ‘cogito’ itself, and, 
subsequently, by submitting them to incessant criticism as regards their mode 
of textual constitution and their criteria of legitimacy.  
2.2  The supplement at the origin 
The explicit stress in the Convention on the globally appealing significance of 
the listed cultural heritage sites and artifacts, alongside their mandated 
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originality, are affirmative of the incidence of authenticity and originality as 
necessary conditions of human existence or as originary loci whereupon the 
notion of humanity is edified. From a deconstructive point of view, authenticity 
and originality are untenable concepts or are as feasible as utopian Platonic 
Idea(l)s. As explicitly argued by Derrida throughout variable writings, at the 
origin lies the process of redoubling [dedoublement], while the second, the copy, 
actually antedates (in a different temporality than linear time) the first, the 
original. This seemingly paradoxical position underlies the ironically 
paradoxical title of this Section (‘authentic supplementarity’), “if this absurd 
expression [originary supplement] may be risked, totally unacceptable as it is 
within classical logic. Rather, the supplement of origin: which supplements the 
failing origin and which is yet not derived; this supplement is, as one says of a 
spare part, of the original make (or a document, establishing the origin)” 
(Derrida, 1997: 313; also see Nesselroth, 2007).  
The supplement is used throughout Derrida’s writings in a similar sense to 
terms, such as trace, remainder, cinder, mark (Wortham, 2010). How is this 
thesis established, and what are the repercussions for the necessary conditions 
of cultural heritage and, subsequently, the ‘survival’ of humanity? 
Redoubling- the word is itself double, saying again in its prefix the repetition, 
reproduction, that is said in doubling. Its sense too is double: it means both to double and 
to double again, hence, a doubling itself subject to doubling, reiterable without a 
controlling limit, doublings […] To begin will always be (or prove to have been) 
redoubling- which is to say no beginning at all (Sallis, 1992: 120), or, nothing. 
Thus, in the beginning of a cultural order we do not encounter ‘original’ 
sites/artifacts, as signs, but doubles or no beginning at all. 
Repetition/reiteration lies at the heart of the production of signs (linguistic or in 
any other modality signs may be produced). And insofar as the cultural 
economy of heritage, as argued in the preceding Section, essentially boils down 
to a semiotic economy, we are concerned, at the origin, with the repetition of 
signs or with the signs’ redoubling. If repetition antedates the original, then 
positing originality as a necessary presupposition for listing a site/artifact in the 
World Heritage List is untenable. But, still, it is not clear why repetition 
antedates and grounds originality. In order to elucidate this cryptic remark let 
us consider Derrida’s arguments for the untenability of originality, and hence 
for the originary redoubling of signs.  
 Derrida’s arguments for the lack of originality and in praise of redoubling 
are interspersed throughout various works, from Grammatology to 
Dissemination to Margins of Philosophy (to name a few) which do not even 
constitute works, in the ‘proper’ sense, but, more often than not, collections of 
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essays, thus works within works (and this extends to intentional juxtapositions 
of different, stylistically dissonant ‘works’, as is the case with Glas). 
Concomitantly, they are framed in different argumentative contexts, while 
engaging with different philosophical/literary/psychoanalytic texts at a time. 
For the sake of consistency with the previous argumentation and with the wider 
argumentative contours of this paper, I shall consider strictly arguments that 
relate signs to redoubling. By extension, the argumentative focus will expand 
towards the relationship between originality and supplementarity (which 
constitutes a reiteration of the relationship between ‘originary’ signs and their 
doubles). The first incidence of the relationship between signs and redoubling 
that I will consider concerns Derrida’s reading of Husserl’s Origin of Geometry 
from Speech and Phenomena (1973), while the extension to the related 
discussion between originality and supplementarity which addresses more 
narrowly the problematic that is raised in this Section, will take place by 
recourse to Of Grammatology (1997). 
 The issue (or, at least, one among the issues, of primary relevance to our 
argumentation) that is examined in Speech and Phenomena with regard to 
Husserlian phenomenology, concerns the prevalence of speech over writing 
(which is also examined in Of Grammatology) in the constitution of subjectivity. 
This prevalence in Derrida’s reading of Husserl’s argumentation is attributed to 
a structure of auto-affection whereby the subject hears itself speaking and, 
hence, becomes present to itself by dint of this auto-affective relationship. “In 
the voice the signifier effaces itself for the sake of the presence of the signified 
meaning; such effacement is possible only because the signifier never really 
escapes self-presence, because in the voice self-presence is preserved” (Sallis, 
1992: 129). This seemingly contradictory statement points to the primacy of the 
subject as speaking subject that retains an originary presence to itself precisely 
by virtue of what is preserved in the voice. This preservation is enabled by 
Husserl’s well-known model for memory, as a structure of protentions carried 
forward from previous utterances in the flow of speech and retentions of 
signifiers from previous utterances, that is as a “doubling of the previous nows 
(or the nows to come) in the present now, that is as retention (or protention); 
and as a doubling, an unlimited repetition, of the now as such, in its ideality, as 
the ideal form of presence” (Sallis, 1992: 135). However, this doubling is more 
originary, as Sallis remarks, than the phenomenologically originary itself. In 
other words, the subject’s presence to itself in a spoken utterance is guaranteed 
by the repetition of signs (correlations between signifiers/signifieds), and not 
merely signifiers, as Sallis’s reading suggests, that are retained from previous 
moments and at the same time protained, that is carried forward in speech.  
Memory needs signs in order to recall the non-present. “The reason for this is 
Authenticated | georgerossolatos123@gmail.com author's copy
Download Date | 8/8/15 7:27 AM
 Double or … Nothing  303 
 
straightforward enough. Precisely because the past is no longer present, no 
longer accessible as a presence in itself, it must have been inscribed as a mark 
that can be repeated from one time to another” (Hagglund, 2008: 51). Hence, the 
subject is not the originary locus of its utterances, but it is constituted in the 
flow of nows as repetitions. The subject’s origin is its double. It is also worth 
noting that for A. Schutz, Husserl’s student whose sociological adaptation of 
phenomenological theory and constant quest for endowing sociology with firm 
philosophical rootings managed to carve unique directions in social 
phenomenological research, the concepts of symbol and sign have been 
instrumental, especially in terms of his later writings on the lifeworld. In this 
context “symbols as part of our social stock of knowledge enable us to indirectly 
communicate experiences of everyday transcendent realities – like religion, 
science, politics, etc. – within the reality of everyday life; through symbols the 
multiple realities are represented within the reality of everyday life and through 
communication these realities can become intersubjective and objectified and 
therefore can influence human action” (Dreher, 2003: 143). The overcoming of 
such transcendences (e.g. religion, politics), as called by Schutz, in the 
intersubjectively constituted lifeworld of the ‘we’ is afforded by symbols 
through the mechanism of appresentation. “The crucial argument within 
Schutz’s sign theory is the assumption that appresentative references are a 
means to overcome experiences of transcendence” (Dreher, 2003: 143). Again, 
in line with our interpretative focus, it merits highlighting that regardless of 
Schutz’s opening up of appresentation to an intersubjectively constituted 
lifeworld in an attempt to eschew his master’s charges of solipsism, the concept 
is still rooted in a metaphysics of presence paradigm that prioritizes presencing 
(i.e. appresentation as ‘ideational’ presencing of non-objectively perceptually 
present objects in the now of an experiential flow; cf. Drummond 2007: 39-40; 
Schutz and Luckmann 1974, Schutz and Luckmann 1989) as apocalyptic horizon.  
 Let us now turn to the arguments for repetition and supplementarity as 
formulated in Of Grammatology (1997). “In the second part of the book, Derrida 
examines Rousseau’s notion that writing forms a ‘dangerous supplement’ to 
speech. For Rousseau – and, indeed, the entire metaphysical tradition before 
and after him, from Plato to Saussure to Husserl and beyond – speech 
constitutes itself as the immediate expression of living presence. Writing, in 
contrast, is viewed as merely a technical, auxiliary and extrinsic form of 
representation. The ‘supplement’ of writing is ‘dangerous’ to the extent that it 
threatens to usurp speech, corrupt the living word, and divide and deaden 
language. Derrida, however, reinhabits the ‘text’ of Rousseau in order to show 
how writing augments speech not just as a mere ‘extra’ laid on top of an already 
fully present and self-sufficient ‘thing’, but as a crucial addition which 
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compensates for a certain shortfall in speech itself. Writing, then, is not merely 
an inessential appendage, but becomes instead the indispensable supplement 
without which speech could not constitute itself in the first place” (Wortham, 
2010: 203). “In each case, the supplement adds itself to an ostensibly ideal or 
original presence in the form of exposing the lack and self-difference at its very 
origin” (p. 204). Thus, Derrida overturns the primacy of speech over writing in 
favor of the latter, which is posited as the necessary supplement without which 
speech could not point to the phantasmatic self-presence of the subject.  
Of particular interest is a specific form of writing which Derrida terms 
‘arche-writing’. “Arche-writing should not be confused with the empirical 
concept of writing or be placed in opposition to speech. Rather, Derrida’s 
argument is that a number of traits associated with empirical writing – such as 
the structure of representation, intrinsic finitude, and the relation to an 
irreducible exteriority – reinforce the conditions of possibility for experience 
and life in general, which is thus characterized by an arche-writing” (Hagglund, 
2008: 51). Arche-writing not only conditions the transcendental subject and, by 
implication, the empirical subject that is conditioned by the transcendental 
subject (in Husserl’s terms), but contains the key terms that permeate western 
philosophy and hence animate and perpetuate the tradition of western 
metaphysics. These terms, by virtue of their originary nature, thus constitute, 
one might say, ‘master-signifiers’ (e.g. the word ‘Psyche’ or ‘Soul’) that are 
correlated with ‘master-signifieds’ (e.g. an invisible force that animates the 
body). Master signifieds have been called transcendental by Derrida in a rather 
pejorative fashion with view to highlighting their illusory presuppositional and 
non-sign dependent status outside of the tradition that is called western 
metaphysics (e.g. the transcendental signifier ‘God’; cf. Rapaport, 1989). I am 
employing the terms master-signifiers and master-signifieds strictly within the 
culturological context of this analysis in order to highlight the function of 
sites/artifacts of ‘outstanding value and significance’ in a cultural semiotic 
economy.  
Arche-writing is originary as a Book of Life that animates a tradition. By 
analogy, the arche-book of culture consists of an archetypical iconography that 
produces its transcendental signifieds as effects of meaning [effets de sens], as 
an involutionary path among the master-signifiers that constitute the Book’s 
rhetoriconatural1 topoi, as sites of inscription of cultural heritage. And insofar 
 
1 I am employing the newly coined neologism ‘rhetoriconatural’ in order to emphasize that the 
cultural sites that are included in the World Heritage List may be natural locations, as referents, 
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as cultural heritage is thus preserved in its arche-writing as the Book of Cultural 
Life, the tourist’s movement that maintains the Book’s omnipresence, 
constitutes neither a progression (towards an always to come revelatory 
moment, as Being’s self-presencing; cf. Nancy, 2008), nor a regression (as the 
presencing of an always unsublatable trace of the primary movement of 
différance that conditions the movement of the Spirit, in Hegelian terms), but as 
what may termed ‘ingression’ within the rheotoriconatural province of the Book 
of culture. The tourist is destined to wander in the Book, without being 
conditioned either by an impending presence, or by an unsublatable absence, 
save for a constant re-location among its loci.    
Now, if the lived experience is equivalent to speech as the subject’s self 
presence to itself and if arche-writing, based on Derrida’s subversion of the 
primacy of speech over writing, conditions life and animates it as its 
‘supplement’ at the origin, then the arche-book of culture ‘in fact’ antedates and 
conditions the actual living of a tourist experience. Indeed, in order for a 
cultural artifact to assume value and significance, it must be adequately 
transformed into an entry in UNESCO’s list of cultural heritage. The artifact does 
not exist outside of the Book (insofar as existence is equivalent to preservation 
according to the rules stipulated by the institutional discourse of the 
organization). Hence, the actual experience of a tourist destination of cultural 
heritage amounts to the enactment of what is already inscribed in the arche-
book of culture, thus affirming Derrida’ s prioritization of the importance of 
writing over speech in maintaining cultural memory, by virtue of 
supplementing the lived experience, as the origin of cultural life. The lived 
experience, then, is destined, since the beginning, to re-trace the iconography 
of its supplementary origin which origin, literally, is nowhere to be found, as it 
is always already its double. The self-referential double-entendre of a tourist 
destination as destiny, as giveness of the plenum of the Book’s topoi from which 
one must chose, constitutes the absolute semiotic constraint on the tourist’s 
‘free choice’ as being destined to return to the Book’s rhetoriconatural topoi 
(also see Rossolatos, 2015). The Book’s destinations constitute the tourist’s 
destiny. Again, return amounts, in this context, to a re-enactment of an 
originary myth of origin or to a consumption of the myth of return through its 
double: free choice. Free choice is the double of compulsion to repeat as return.  
Hence, choosing to visit is doubly removed from actually arriving at one’s 
destination, which impossibility of arrival conditions and fuels the desire to 
 
yet they assume their value and significance within the rhetorical semiotic structure of 
UNESCO’s Convention as Book of Life (cultural life, that is). 
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proliferate the destinations as cultural attractions. “One wishes to go back from 
the supplement to the source: one must recognize that there is a supplement at 
the source” (Derrida, 1997: 304). “Man allows himself to be announced to 
himself after the fact of supplementarity, which is thus not an attribute – 
accidental or essential – of man. For on the other hand, supplementarity, which 
is nothing, neither a presence nor an absence, is neither a substance nor an 
essence of man. It is precisely the play of presence and absence, the opening of 
this play that no metaphysical or ontological concept can comprehend. 
Therefore this property [propre] of man is not a property of man: it is the very 
dislocation of the proper in general” (Derrida, 1997: 244).  
The supplementarity of/at the origin posits significant constraints to the 
legitimate use of the term ‘authentic experiences’. If originality rests with 
supplementarity and the cultural Book of Life is a repository of traces, then 
authenticity amounts to re-tracing. “For Derrida, every original must in fact be a 
derivation; everything is because of the ‘bad infinite’ of contamination” 
(O’Connor, 2010: 88). And insofar as retracing implies repetition and reiteration, 
quite oxymoronically, it cannot be authentic. Thus, another metaphysical veil 
has been lifted, that of experiencing authentically, rather than retracing.  
2.3  The pyramid is not the sign, the sign is the pyramid 
The signs that make up the cultural Book of Life or its iconography, then, 
constitute the inscriptions of traces that await to be brought back to life. The 
pictures and the architectural designs of monuments of ‘outstanding 
significance and cultural value’, such as pyramids, do not portray in absentia 
the original sites/artifacts of value, but the simulacral manifestations of traces 
that condition the potential experience of pyramids as the referent of the Book’s 
contents: “the trace simultaneously traced and erased, simultaneously living 
and dead, and, as always, living in its simulation of life’s preserved inscription” 
(Derrida, 1982: 24). The pyramid preserves the mirage of immortality, which 
simply means that it re-presents immortality, where what is presenced in this 
representation is the mirage at the origin or an originary instance of a cultural 
formation that must be preserved throughout eternity in order to legitimate the 
non-contingent nature of cultural life; yet, this non-contingency is incumbent 
on a mirage.  
The pyramid as tomb is also defined in the Pit and the Pyramid (in Derrida, 
1982: 82) as what “shelters, maintains in reserve, capitalizes on life by marking 
that life continues elsewhere”. This ‘elsewhere’ is not some sort of phantasmatic 
after-life, but the very province of the sign as container of immortality. The 
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pyramid as sign resists time and temporalizes forever (immortalizes) its referent. 
The sign, then, is the pyramid (Derrida, 1982: 84), while its referent (the 
physical pyramid) is its shadow. “If signs are monuments in which 
immortalized living souls reside, then one can see the pharaonic grave - the 
pyramid - as the sign of all signs” (Sloterdijk, 2009: 55). Subsequently, visiting 
the pyramids merely amounts to casting a shadow on the signs that are the true 
carriers of immortality (the Book’s, that is).  
What is most remarkable about the symbolic form of the pyramid and 
concomitantly about its relationship with the structure of meaning it 
substantiates, is the involutionary path whereby the pyramidal structure 
assumes meaning as self-contained form. The flow of immortality’s meaning, 
thus, is enacted as a passage from the surface to the bottom of the pyramid, 
from the visible to the invisible side of this self-contained whole, as noted in 
Derrida’s reading of the respective passage from Hegel’s Aesthetics (Derrida, 
1982: 85).  
2.4  We hope you enjoyed your visit to the supplement 
Having, thus far, analyzed the logic of supplementarity, as constitutive (and 
absent, in terms of the self-presence of referents in their materiality) traces of 
originary loci, let us now further consider some crucial implications for the 
meaning of ‘authentic tourist experiences’, given that authenticity constitutes a 
key motivation (Poria et al., 2006) for undertaking a trip to a tourist destination 
in the ‘first place’.  
Although, in this instance, we are concerned with a visit to a singular space, 
the very conditions that foreground consumption still abide by the rationale of 
the double, insofar as the desire to consume has been instigated by televisual, 
internet images, by memorabilia, such as postal cards, etc. That is, the original 
locus has already been re-inscribed in numerous copies, in various formats that 
triggered the desire to consume the ‘origin’ in the ‘first place’. But also, proof of 
having consumed a tourist experience usually resides in take-aways, such as 
postcards, t-shirts, etc. The actual locus is absent from the re-collection; what is 
present is a set of doubles that condition ‘its’ recollection. Moreover, given the 
minutely photographed, videoed and e-produced textuality of ‘originals’ 
nowadays, by dint of amply available and easily accessible production and 
editing means, and their dissemination in blogs, such as YouTube and Pinterest, 
the actual visit to an original locus in fact constitutes a re-enactment of 
memories that have been inscribed by virtue of the presence of a series of 
doubles. In this sense, the double not only is synchronous with the origin, as 
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suggested by Derrida, but antedates and conditions the consumption of the 
original. In fact, the model is the double, insofar as satisfaction conditionals 
about the quality of the tourist experience rest with comparisons between the 
expectations that were nurtured by the double and the actual encounter with 
the double’s ‘origin’. “We do not have an undivided origin of signification, 
governed by a presence, but an origin which is itself already doubled by dint of 
the nature of the sign” (Johnson, 1993: 123). 
An army of signifiers has been recruited for bringing about the in vivo 
experiencing of a master-signified of origin, while being responsible for 
bringing about as their effect its lived experience. Hence, the lived experience of 
an originary locus constitutes a re-collection that in fact stems from myriads of 
dispersed supplements that add ever ramifying twists to the meaning of the 
locus as always narratively mediated and not as brute, unmediated fact 
(contrary to what Chronis [2006: 283] calls sensory authenticity) or as physical 
sites/artifacts simpliciter.  
3  The rhetorical topography of exemplary cultural 
sites  
In the process of deconstructing ‘original myths of origin’ in the preceding 
Section, allusion was made in passing to transcendental signifieds and to the 
intended employment of the terms ‘master signifiers’ and ‘master signifieds’. 
Let us now dwell further on how transcendental signifieds come to pass and 
what such signifieds may be in the context of UNESCO’s institutional discourse 
of cultural heritage. This discussion will deploy against the background of 
another seminal textual unweaving tactic in the deconstruction(ist) toolbox, viz., 
that of exemplarity. Let us, then, begin with an overview of the meaning of 
exemplarity in Derridean discourse and then proceed with contextualizing it in 
the face of the concerned corpus.  
 “In some respects one could argue that Derrida’s work has from its 
inception never been concerned with anything other than exemplarity” (Harvey, 
1992b: 194). Exemplarity is the textual operation that is responsible for the 
production of the ‘excess’ of meaning that emerges from transcendental (master) 
signifiers and signifieds. Exemplarity may be said to be akin to the rhetorical 
figure of synecdoche (as sub-type of metonymy), insofar as both are concerned 
with pointing to wholes via the employment of parts. Exemplarity, just like 
synecdoche, urges us to imagine the presence of a semantic class in its entirety, 
with just part of the whole being actually given in a sentence (e.g. sail for ship). 
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The difference, of course, as with all instances where Derrida’s neologisms differ 
from existing rhetorical operations and figures, is that exemplarity functions at 
a deeper level of the production of textuality, than the relationship between 
particular/universal. “In turn, the simple movements from particular to general, 
or from general to particular, must be rethought, rearticulated, and redescribed 
as a result of the complex structures of exemplarity” (Harvey, 2002: 260). 
Derrida’s employment of the textual unweaving tactic of exemplarity is 
intended to demonstrate how excess of meaning for master signifiers and 
signifieds is produced not as a determinate relationship between a particular 
and a universal, but between a determinate particular (the example) and an 
indeterminate universal that is posited (presenced) as its a-textual Other (e.g. 
God). Exemplars are examples, but not just any examples; they are outstanding 
examples of what they aim at exemplifying, and, hence, they are particularly 
pertinent for our case, which is concerned with cultural sites/artifacts of 
‘outstanding value and significance’. Exemplarity may demonstrate how this 
‘outstanding’ meaning (an outstanding synonym of exemplary, indeed) is 
produced within the institutional discourse of UNESCO’s guidelines. At the 
same time, the adoption of a deconstructive reading affords to lay bare what is 
suppressed in the process of evoking specific examples of outstanding cultural 
heritage as exemplary, and, subsequently, of the contingent nature of any 
claims to exemplarity and the de-flation of the ‘inflated’ transcendental 
signifieds that sustain this exemplary discourse.   
 “The question of the surplus hidden within the examples entails a system 
that Derrida calls another logic. This is the logic of parergonality. Namely, the 
condition of the possibility of reading examples otherwise hinges on a certain 
untamed and untameable, non-masterable excess” (Harvey, 1992a: 60). “The 
question of the inflation of examples into Exemplars is concerned with a certain 
transformation of value that inhabits this movement […] The Exemplar is thus 
not only a better example than the example, but also becomes an example for 
example” (p. 65). 
With regard to Kant’s third Critique (Critique of Judgment) whereupon 
Derrida draws in his argumentation for exemplarity/parergonality, it becomes 
evident that the ultimate criterion for accepting the exemplary status of a 
spectacle (e.g. a waterfall; cf. Kant, 1987: 286) vis-à-vis an aesthetic judgment of 
the Sublime as the ‘excessive’ element in a judgmental structure that yields 
community bonding pre-reflectively, and yet, with a transcendental force that is 
only available to Reason de jure, is the enshrinement of the example within the 
transcendental idealist contours of Kantian discourse. It is the philosophical 
context that permits the catapulting of example to exemplar and hence forces 
the signifier of a waterfall to function as a master signifier that allows us to 
Authenticated | georgerossolatos123@gmail.com author's copy
Download Date | 8/8/15 7:27 AM
310  George Rossolatos  
 
glimpse the Sublime as excess (transcendental signified) in the example.  Again, 
we are not confronted in this instance with the employment of just a rhetorical 
figure (e.g. a hyperbole). Whereas a hyperbole contains manifest linguistic 
elements that render it apt for functioning as such, the exemplar only contains 
invisible traces of another logic (parergonality) that render the example apt for 
being recognized as exemplary. The same holds for the Book of Culture or 
UNESCO’s list of Cultural heritage, a list that includes (outstanding) exemplars 
of cultural value and significance that are exemplary by virtue of their inclusion 
in the Book. The transcendental signified (sublime as aesthetic judgment in the 
Kantian third Critique or outstanding as aesthetic judgment in UNESCO’s Book) 
is instituted performatively in a rhetorically constituted assertion or hyperbolic 
judgment about the exemplar’s excess tout court. This remark affords to 
elucidate the inflationary movement from example to exemplar. Furthermore, 
this position suggests that there is no teleology in the cultural site/artifact or the 
tourist attraction, in this respect, that render them apt for being labeled as 
‘original’ or authentic, but a system of determined positions in a global cultural 
map of the origin, of which they partake as toponyms or rhetorical sign-posts. 
Otherwise, we are confronted with “the purity and nothingness of the artwork 
[site/artifact], and also the randomness of the artwork [site/artifact]. There is no 
teleology of the artwork [site/artifact]” (Stocker, 2006: 160). Hence, each 
consumption act of an ‘original’ cultural site/artifact is tantamount to a re-
enactment, and thus repetition2/revisiting of a topos that is part and parcel of a 
given global cultural economy. “Inflating a particular case to make it not only a 
particular, but paradigmatic, the law of itself and all others (like itself) has its 
foundation and authorization only in this web of unexamined exemplarity. The 
foreclosure is reinforced by leaving the issue outside of the text – outside of the 
bounds of relevance, as if it also “goes without saying” (Harvey, 2002: 199). 
Harvey (2002) assimilates examples to enthymemes, thus affirming the 
topical nature of exemplarity. By the same token, we may assert that exemplary 
tourist destinations as sites and artifacts of superior cultural heritage constitute 
material instantiations of rhetorical topoi. By extension, the cultural arche-
writing as the Book that contains them and that legitimates their managers to 
lay claim to originality as their ‘proprius’ is equivalent to a rhetorical arche-
 
2 “Despite this, repetition, in Derrida’s model, does not imply repetition of the same, a second 
apparition identically doubling the first; this too is death. The repetition of the sign is a 
differential repetition which refers to the same only through a system of other signs, as Derrida 
argues in ‘Ellipse’” (Johnson, 1993: 56).  
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topography (also see Harvey, 2002a: 68 on the rhetorical topography of 
exemplarity).  
4  Debunking the exemplary status of UNESCO’s  
world heritage list  
As our last destination in this tourist meta-cartography, let us endeavor to 
deconstruct the exemplary status of the sites/artifacts that populate UNESCO’s 
World Heritage List. As above noted, exemplarity is posited in examples as a 
semantically excessive element that is constitutive of the very transcendentality 
of transcendental signifiers (e.g. God), but also of judgments that copulate 
hyperbolic predicates with master-signifiers, such as ‘outstanding’, as their 
master-signifieds. Nevertheless, in the majority of instances where such master-
signifiers/signifieds are posited in cultural discourses, we experience the 
incidence of alternative signifiers/signifieds that have been cunningly 
suppressed by the employed arche-rhetorical topography.  
While considering these suppressed signifiers, as Labadi (2007) remarks, 
three categories of cultural heritage are posited for inclusion in UNESCO’s 
World Heritage List: the most typical sites (European religious properties), 
typical sites (non-European religious properties) and under-represented sites 
(industrial heritage). Not at all surprisingly, the metaphysical discourse that 
underpins UNESCO’s view on outstanding value and significance is materially 
reflected in the signifiers that disproportionately populate the World Heritage 
List, that is religious sites. By definition, the preservation of humanity walks 
hand in hand with the leveling of differences (Walsh, 1992), both in terms of 
surface elements of the signifier and in terms of a limited set of signifieds. In 
this instance, we may notice an utter undervaluation (in this impossible 
exchange system of priceless sites/artifacts) of popular culture artifacts, such as 
the first electronic music record or sites, such as the first club where House 
music was played.  
The Heritage list assumes latently, yet utterly arbitrarily, a 
valuation/cultural evaluation hierarchy, where religious sites are more 
important than popular culture sites, and hence exemplary of what is worth 
being preserved in order to avoid the risk of humanity’s cultural extinction. Of 
course, this (e)valuative excess is constituted and legitimated strictly within the 
self-referential discourse of UNESCO’s criteria for inclusion in the Book, while 
being hardly reflective of a globally binding, and not segment-specific cultural 
ethos.  
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 Finally, as regards the transcendental signified, “outstanding universal 
value is a notion that raises many theoretical issues in relation to the concept of 
values and of the representation of the past. One particularly complex issue 
concerns the notion of universalism. Universalist frameworks, including that of 
the World Heritage Convention, have been increasingly criticized in the past few 
decades. These themes and frameworks were usually Eurocentric. Indeed, as of 
July 2006, 50% of all the sites on this list were located in Europe” (Labadi, 2007: 
152). “Universalist frameworks have been criticized for creating ‘epistemological 
injustices’ through the marginalization of the voices, experiences and histories 
of minority groups” (Labadi, 2007: 153). In addition to the universalist 
framework that is used for framing the master signifieds that have been posited 
as a prioristic (transcendental) criteria for the inclusion of sites/artifacts in the 
World Heritage List, specific transcendental signifieds are regularly assumed by 
researchers as being universally binding.  As, hopefully, demonstrated in this 
paper, a deconstructive reading may aid in unearthing such latent 
presuppositions. For example, Wong (2014; also see Poria et al., 2006) draws an 
a priori distinction between staged and non-staged tourist experiences, while 
identifying authenticity with a sense of non-stageness. “Many scholars agree 
that authenticity of objects can be classified into two forms: those that have 
been mediated or commodified and those that pertain to their indigenous 
integrity (MacCannell, 1973). The former correspond to staged authenticity, 
which is a synthetic or re-created version of the true culture or heritage. They 
represent contrived tourism products that are meant to serve tourists for leisure, 
entertainment, and commercial purposes. The latter correspond to real 
indigenous culture or heritage that is unmediated and reflects an objective 
reality of a destination” (Wong, 2014: 4). Obviously, this distinction is oblivious 
to the supplementarity at the origin, by virtue of which positing authenticity as 
a transcendental signified for tourist attractions is untenable. Subsequently, 
this distinction is oblivious to the inherent non-difference between mediated 
motives and unmediated ones. The distinction also assumes tacitly a (by now 
largely abandoned in cultural studies) divide between high and low culture, 
while identifying arbitrarily high culture with ‘indigenous’ culture and low 
culture with the entertainment business. “Based on the cultural tourist typology 
(McKercher, 2002), these tourists can be classified as incidental and casual 
cultural tourists if they merely look for a shallow cultural experience and focus 
more on entertainment based cultural appeals. On the other hand, purposeful 
and serendipitous cultural tourists search for deeper and more genuine cultural 
experience that possesses educational value” (Wong, 2014: 4). Against what 
transcendental aesthetic criteria and defunct metaphysical binarisms of 
civilization/culture (in a nostalgic Adornian vein) are we legitimated in a post-
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post modern cultural predicament that is defined by eclecticism (Walsh, 1992), 
experimentation and pastiche, rather than by a pious endorsement of immobile 
transcendental signifieds, to confer judgments of superior (outstanding) value 
for an artifact, such as a Michelangelo painting, as against a Kraftwerk record? 
Or for a cultural site, such as Notre Dame, as against a dance club, such as 
Hacienda?   
Again, such distinctions only afford to perpetuate myths of origin, such as 
the origination of transcendental signifieds from nationally demarcated 
territories (“the importance of heritage as a concept is linked directly to that of 
modernist nationalism and the nation-state remains pre-eminent in the 
definition and management of heritage; UNESCO’s World Heritage Sites, for 
example, are nominated by national governments” [Graham, 2002: 1005]; “in a 
process of establishing and strengthening modern national subjectivities, 
tourist sites become institutionalized platforms for collective remembering” 
[Chronis, 2006: 293]), rather than from the rhetorical arche-topography of the 
Book, as World Heritage List; and by mistakenly identifying entertainment with 
doubling (in a pejorative fashion as part of a latent hierarchy), in oblivion of the 
very double at the heart of originality and originary cultural loci.    
5  That was an original experience… 
The operation of supplementarity allows us to glimpse though the 
contradictions in UNESCO’s Convention that were pointed out in the 
Introduction. Most eminently, how is it possible to predicate pricelessness of 
cultural heritage and at the same time claim that humanity would become 
impoverished in the event of the loss of this heritage? How can someone 
become poorer by losing something that cannot be priced and hence exchanged 
in the first place? As suggested by the analysis that was undertaken throughout 
this paper, the answer lies in the irretrievable traces that condition the self-
presencing of a cultural system as Book of Culture. Cultural heritage is priceless 
precisely due to the impossibility of pricing the differential relations among the 
rhetoriconatural loci that make up the Book, insofar as excessive/outstanding 
value for the sites/artifacts that make up the Book emerges by virtue of being 
included as topoi in the Book. The ‘physical’ sites are there to remind us of the 
process of redoubling whereby they have become enshrined (immortalized) as 
pyramidal signs in the Book, which constitutes their supplementary origin. The 
sites/artifacts that are included in the Book are exemplary of cultural heritage 
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due to their inclusion in the Book, wherein they will be preserved even if the 
actual sites perish.  
 The deconstruction of the exemplary status of the sites/artifacts that are 
included in the World Heritage List, pointed to the purely contingent criteria 
whereby they become immortalized, at the expense of popular cultural artifacts 
which, in essence, are more reflective and definitive of the post-post modern 
cultural ethos, but also more reflective of the acceptance of the conflation 
between double and original or of the double at the origin that is lacking from 
the metaphysical discourse that underpins UNESCO’s criteria for inclusion in 
the World’s most outstanding cultural artifacts/sites. 
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